

The Contested Semantics of 'Security' and the Current Challenges of Big Data and IoT

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<http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/CSS> { .html, .pdf }

**Cybercake, the Institute of Law and Technology,
and CSIRT-MU – Masaryk University**

24 November 2016

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The Contested Semantics of 'Security' and the Current Challenges of Big Data and IoT


Agenda

- The Contested Semantics of 'Security'
- The Concept of 'National Security'
- Current Challenges – Big Data, IoT
- The Critical Roles of Evaluation, Quality Assurance and Risk Mngt

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<http://www.odt.org/southupmaps.htm>

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The Notion of Security

A condition
in which harm does not arise
despite the occurrence of threatening events

A set of safeguards
whose purpose is
to achieve that condition

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
4

The Conventional Security Model


Key Concepts

- A **Threat** is a circumstance that could result in Harm
 - A **Threatening Event** is an instance of a generic Threat
 - A Threat may be natural, accidental or intentional
 - An intentional Threatening Event is an **Attack**
 - A party that creates an Intentional Threat is an **Attacker**
 - A **Vulnerability** is a susceptibility to a Threat
 - **Harm** is any kind of deleterious consequence to an **Asset**
-
- A **Safeguard** is a measure to counter a Threat
 - A **Countermeasure** is an action to circumvent a Safeguard


The Conventional Security Model




The Conventional Security Model



The Conventional Security Model + Stakeholder



The Conventional Security Model + Safeguards




<http://www.rogerclarke.com/EC/PBAR.html#App1>

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The Conventional Security Model + Countermeasures



<http://www.rogerclarke.com/EC/PBAR.html#App1>

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Asset, Harm, Value, Stakeholder

- **Harm** means deleterious impact on an **Asset**
- But which Harm matters, to which Assets?
- That depend on the perspective that's adopted and the **Values** that are perceived in Assets
- So it's necessary to define **Stakeholders**

'Whose Security?'


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<http://www.rogerclarke.com/EC/WS-1301.html>

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The Scope of Security




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
The Organisational Scope of Security



Tensions


- Among Organisational Objectives
 - Certain Costs vs. Contingent Costs
 - Financial Cost vs. Non-Quantifiables
 - Business-As-Usual vs. Invisibles

A Broader Scope for Security



Competition between Corporations
Collaboration, esp. re IT Infrastructure

A Yet Broader Scope for Security



IT Infrastructure for Economic Development
Competition among Nations
'Critical IT Infrastructure'

Industry Sectors Designated by Governments as 'Critical Infrastructure'

- Military-Industrial incl. Cryptography
- Transport
- Communications
- Energy
- Water
- Public Health
- Emergency Services
- Law Enforcement
- Agriculture
- Financial Services

itnews

Brandis pushes telco security reforms into parliament

By Allie Coyne on Nov 9, 2016 4:46PM


By Allie Coyne
Nov 9 2016
4:46PM

0 Comments

Govt insists bill isn't intended to lock out Huawei.

The federal government is pushing ahead with a plan to force telcos to inform it about network changes and procurement intentions, today introducing its long-awaited security bill into parliament.


A Mostly-Forgotten Scope for Security



Tensions

- Among Organisational Objectives
 - Certain Costs vs. Contingent Costs
 - Financial Cost vs. Non-Quantifiables
 - Business-as-usual vs. Invisibles
- Among Alternative Scope Definitions
 - A bot doesn't harm the host, so there's no incentive to fix it (it's an 'externality')
 - Copyright material on P2P networks
 - Personal, Organisational, Sectoral, National, Supra-National Agency Interests

Yet More, Alternative Scope Definitions




**Add in 'Society'. What about 'Humanity'?
What about the Biosphere, the Troposphere?**

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The Contested Semantics of 'Security'




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Who are the Champions for Each Perspective?




**Which have Power?
What Coalitions are feasible?**

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And where is 'National Security'?



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Is this 'National Security'?

The protection of a nation from attack or other danger by holding adequate armed forces and guarding state secrets

Encompasses economic security, monetary security, energy security, environmental security, military security, political security and security of energy and natural resources

<http://definitions.uslegal.com/n/national-security/>

"specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy"

US Freedom of Information Act

Or is this 'National Security'?

- **Critical Infrastructure Security**
Bombs in ports, ships, railways, energy, ...
Anthrax in the water supply, ...
- **Public Safety**
Bombs in aircraft, mayhem in marketplaces
Major Events, e.g. 'The Euros', The Olympics
- **Prominent Person Safety**
Bush and Blair; Rushdie and Kurt Westergaard
Gx, APEC, CHOGM, ...

'Terrorism'

The use of violence or the threat of violence,
especially against civilians,
in order to alarm the public,
in the pursuit of political [or politico-religious] goals

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'Terrorism' has been conflated with 'National Security'

Some Current Challenges

- Big Data Analytics
- Internet of Things
- (Evaluation Techniques)

Vroom, Vroom The 'Hype' Factor in Big Data

- Volume
- Velocity
- Variety
- Value
- **Veracity**
- **Validity**
- **Visibility**

Use Categories for Big Data Analytics

- **Population Focus**
 - Hypothesis Testing
 - Population Inferencing
 - Profile Construction
- **Individual Focus**
 - Outlier Discovery
 - Inferencing about Individuals
 - Inconsistencies
 - Non/-conformance with a profile

Bug Data Risk Factors

Data Quality

(Assessable at time of collection)

- D1 Syntactic Validity
- D2 Appropriate (Id)entity Association
- D3 Appropriate Attribute Association
- D4 Appropriate Attribute Signification
- D5 Accuracy
- D6 Precision
- D7 Temporal Applicability

Information Quality

(Assessable only at time of use)

- I1 Theoretical Relevance
- I2 Practical Relevance
- I3 Currency
- I4 Completeness
- I5 Controls
- I6 Auditability



Big Data Risk Factors Decision Quality

1. Appropriateness of the Inferencing Technique
2. Data Meaning
3. Data Relevance
4. Transparency
 - Process
 - Criteria

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'Quality Factors in Big Data and Big Data Analytics'
<http://www.rogerclarke.com/EC/BDQF.html#DeQF>

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Scenario – Insider Detection

The Minister gives terse instructions about whistleblowers (Brutus, Judas Iscariot, Macbeth, Manning, Snowden, ...)

The agency:

- Increases intrusiveness and frequency of employee vetting
- Lowers the threshold for positive vetting
- Exercises its powers to gain access to and consolidate:
 - border movements • credit history • court records
 - LEA persons-of-interest lists • financial tracking alerts
 - all internal communications • social media postings
- Applies big data analytics to the consolidated database

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<http://www.rogerclarke.com/EC/BDBR.html#BDAQ>
<http://www.itnews.com.au/News/391656,brandis-boosts-vetting-of-aps-staff-to-prevent-insider-threats.aspx> (2 Sep 2014)

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Quality Assurance and Risk Management for Big Data Projects

1. Frameworks
2. Data Consolidation
3. Effective Anonymisation
4. Data Scrubbing
5. Decision-Making

<http://www.rogerclarke.com/EC/BDRM.html>

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<http://www.rogerclarke.com/EC/BDQAS.html>
Euro Intel & Security Informatics Conf., Uppsala, 17-19 August 2016

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{ Ubiquitous Computing, Pervasive Computing, Ambient Intelligence, Mobility and } The (Inter)net of (Every)Thing(s) and People

eObject – An object not inherently computerised, but into which has been embedded one or more computer processors with data-collection, data-handling and data communication capabilities

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Manwaring K. & Clarke R. (2015)
Computer Law & Security Review 31,5 (October 2015) 586–603
<http://www.rogerclarke.com/II/SSRN-id2613198.pdf>

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- Active capacity
- Adaptability
- Addressability
- Associability with animals
- Autonomy
- Dependency
- Geo-Locatability
- Human computer interaction
- Identifiability
- Network Locatability
- Mobility
- Impacts
- Portability
- Prevalence
- Use pattern
- Volatility

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Manwaring K. & Clarke R. (2015)
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Security Challenges within IoT Systems

Cisco, February 2016

- **Minimal-Capacity Devices** – very little physical security, and very little scope for programmed security features
- **Minimal Power**, and minimal data transmission capacity
- **No Backup Connectivity or Power**
- **Inexpensive, High-Volume Manufacture**
i.e. high failure rate and unpredictable, often short life
- **Volatile Swarms**, limited expertise in managing them
- **Complex, Multi-Party Networks**
of contractual and operational relationships
- **Legal Responsibilities and Liabilities** utterly unclear

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<http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/secure-iot-proposed-framework.html>

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IoT as DDoS Vector

- What was new ... was ... the particular devices the attackers recruited. Instead of using traditional computers for **their botnet**, they **used CCTV cameras, digital video recorders, home routers, and other embedded computers attached to the Internet as part of the Internet of Things** [Sep 2016]

'Security Economics of the Internet of Things'
<https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/2016/1015.html#1>

- **'Source Code for IoT Botnet 'Mirai' Released'** [Oct 2016]
<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/source-code-for-iot-botnet-mirai-released/>

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24 November 2016

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Cybersecurity in Australia

- **Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC)**
Since Nov 2014 – <http://www.asd.gov.au/infosec/acsc.htm>
"brings together cyber security capabilities from Defence, Attorney-General's Department/GovCERT, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Aust Federal Police and Australian Crime Commission in a single location"
- **Cyber Security Strategy (Apr 2016)**
<http://malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/launch-of-australias-cyber-security-strategy>, <https://cybersecuritystrategy.dpmc.gov.au/>
Assistant Minister for Cyber Security
Special Adviser to the PM on Cyber Security
Minister for Foreign Affairs' Cyber Ambassador
Annual Cyber Security Forums
Cyber Security Growth [Innovation] Centre

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The screenshot shows an article from ITnews. The headline is "Defence reveals new home for Australian Cyber Security Centre". The byline is "By Allie Coyne on Nov 11, 2016 4:18PM". The article text reads: "Plots move out of ASIO building. The federal Defence department is planning to spend \$39 million moving the Australian Cyber Security Centre out of its existing home in ASIO's Canberra headquarters and down the road to the Brindabella Business Park. The federal government announced its intention to relocate the ACSC out from the Ben Chifley Building in an effort to make it more accessible to businesses and other government workers. The ACSC, launched in 2014, houses 260 cyber security experts from across Defence, the Attorney-General's Department, ASIO, the AFP and the Australian Crime Commission, and acts as an information sharing hub for government and the private sector. But an expansion of its operations - prompted by the promise of personnel boosts for cyber security in the government's April national cyber security strategy - has meant the ACSC will outgrow its current premises, Defence said in a submission to a parliamentary inquiry scrutinising its plans. Moving the centre is also intended to address criticisms about access to the centre inside the high-security ASIO building. "While most of the current space is operating at close to full occupancy, some areas are underutilised due to the difficulties associated with obtaining the appropriate clearances," Defence said." To the right of the text is a photograph of the Ben Chifley ASIO building, a modern structure with a curved glass facade.

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<http://www.itnews.com.au/news/defence-reveals-new-home-for-australian-cyber-security-centre-441199>

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