Regulatory Failure in the Security Space: Some Current Cases

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### Crime and Justice Research Centre QUT – 12 September 2016







## **The Notion of Security**

A condition in which harm does not arise despite the occurrence of threatening events

> A set of safeguards whose purpose is to achieve that condition



# The Conventional Security Model Key Concepts


- A Threat is a circumstance that could result in Harm
   A Threatening Event is an instance of a generic Threat
   A Threat may be natural, accidental or intentional
   An intentional Threatening Event is an Attack
   A party that creates an Intentional Threat is an Attacker
- A **Vulnerability** is a susceptibility to a Threat
- Harm is any kind of deleterious consequence to an Asset
- A **Safeguard** is a measure to counter a Threat
- A **Countermeasure** is an action to circumvent a Safeguard

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# The Conventional Security Model

http://www.rogerclarke.com/ EC/PBAR.html#App1






## Asset, Harm, Value, Stakeholder

- Harm means deleterious impact on an Asset
- But which Harm matters, to which Assets?
- That depend on the perspective that's adopted and the **Values** that are perceived in Assets
- So it's necessary to define **Stakeholders**

# 'Whose Security?'




## **The Scope of Security**






## The Organisational Scope of Security






## The Many Scopes of Security



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## And where is 'National Security'?



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## Is this 'National Security'?

The protection of a nation from attack or other danger by holding adequate armed forces and guarding <u>state secrets</u>

Encompasses economic security, monetary security, energy security, environmental security, military security, political security and security of energy and natural resources

http://definitions.uslegal.com/n/national-security/

"specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy"

US Freedom of Information Act



## **Or is this 'National Security'?**

- **Critical Infrastructure Security** Bombs in ports, ships, railways, energy, ... Anthrax in the water supply, ...
- Public Safety

Bombs in aircraft, mayhem in marketplaces Major Events, e.g. 'The Euros', The Olympics

• **Prominent Person Safety** Bush and Blair; Rushdie and Kurt Westergaard Gx, APEC, CHOGM, ...



## 'Terrorism'

The use of violence or the threat of violence, especially against civilians, in order to alarm the public, in the pursuit of political [or politico-religious] goals

'Terrorism' has been conflated with 'National Security'



## 2. The Regulatory Framework

Forms: Actors:	Formal Regulation ('Government')	Co-Regulation	Industry Self-Regulation	Organisational Self-Regulation ('Governance')
The State	Determines	Negotiates	Influences	Has Limited
	What and How	What and How	What	Influence
Industry Assocn	Influences	Negotiates	Determines	Influences
	What and How	What and How	What and How	What and How
Corporations	Contribute to	Contribute to	Contribute to	Determine
	Industry Assocn	Industry Assocn	Industry Assocn	What and How
Other Stakeholders	May or May Not Have Some Influence			

Statutes &	Statutory Codes	Industry Codes	Customer
Delegated	& Standards	& Standards	Charters
Legislation			



Clarke & Bennett Moses (2014) http://www.rogerclarke.com/SOS/Drones-PS.html#R

## How to Recognise An Effective Regulatory Scheme

#### Process

- Clarity of Aims, Requirements
- Transparency
- Participation
- Reflection of Stakeholder Interests

#### Product

- Comprehensiveness
- Parsimony
- Articulation
- Educative Value
- Appropriate Generality and Specificity

#### Outcomes

- Oversight
- Enforceability
- Enforcement
- Review



Clarke & Bennett Moses (2014) http://www.rogerclarke.com/SOS/Drones-PS.html#R

## 3. Some Test-Cases

- **1. PIAs for National Security Initiatives**
- 2. Big Data Analytics
- 3. The 'Internet of Things' ...
- 4. Remotely-Piloted Drones
- 5. Autonomous Cars
- 6. The EC GDPR's DPIA
- 7. The Precautionary Principle



# **'Terrorism' and National Security** The Australian Context

- Each decade pre 2000 saw some such event(s)
- 2002 88 Australian deaths in Bali, • at a nightclub frequented by Australians
- Deaths 2000's (0), 2010s (1)
- 2015 1 domestic murder by a 15yo 'lone wolf' That's the sole death in Australia since 2001
- Several credible claims of interdiction 2001-15
- But periodic large-scale raids come up near-empty:  $\bullet$ successful prosecutions of only 15 individuals re 6 instances of preparation to commit an act (+ 1!)

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https://www.crikey.com.au/2014/09/04/ the-real-threat-of-terrorism-to-australians-by-the-numbers/ http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-25/ fact-file3b-five-facts-about-terrorism-in-australia/6226086 https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?country=14

## National Security Measures Since 2001 Have Compromised Many Human Rights

- Freedom from Arbitrary Detention (ICCPR Art. 9)
- Freedom of Movement (Art. 12)
- Right to a Fair Trial (Art. 14.1), Minimum Guarantees in Criminal Proceedings (Art.14.2-14-7)
- Privacy (Art.17)
- Freedom of Information, Opinion, Expression (Art. 19)
- Freedom of Association (Art. 22)
- Other Rights Potentially at Risk (Arts. 2.1, 7, 15, 21, 24, 26, 27)



http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/IANS.html#App4 Extracted from AHRC (2008), Williams (2011), HRLC (2011, 2012) LCA (2012), Lynch et al. (2014)

## **Evaluation Meta-Principles**

#### **Pre-Conditions**

- 1. Evaluation
- 2. Consultation
- 3. Transparency
- 4. Justification

### Design

- 5. Proportionality
- 6. Mitigation
- 7. Controls

**Post-Condition** 8. Audit

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## Whose Security? A Case Study PIAs and National Security in Australia

## **Privacy Impact Assessment**

- a systematic process, which ...
- identifies and evaluates ...
- from the perspectives of all stakeholders ...
- the potential effects on privacy of ...
- a project, initiative or proposed system or scheme
- and which includes a search for ways to avoid or mitigate negative privacy impacts

## **Reasons to do a PIA**

- **Surfacing and Examination** of the privacy impacts and implications of a proposal
- Development of a clear understanding of the Business Need that justifies the proposal and its negative impacts
- **Gauging of the Acceptability** of the proposal and its features by organisations and people that will be affected by it
- [ Assessment of Compliance of the proposal with existing privacy-related laws, codes, best practices and guidelines ]
- Constructive Search for, and Evaluation of, better Alternatives
- Constructive Search for ways to Avoid Negative Impacts, and ways to Mitigate Unavoidable Negative Impacts
- Documentation and Publication of the **Outcomes**



'Privacy Impact Assessment: Its Origins and Development' Computer Law & Security Review 25, 2 (April 2009) 123-135 http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/PIAHist-08.html

## **3.1 A Five-Factor Test of the Efficacy of a PIA**

- 1. Is there evidence of a PIA process being **performed**?
- 2. Were advocacy organisations **aware** of that process?
- 3. Did the project sponsor(s) **engage** with advocacy organisations?
- 4. Was the PIA **Report published** on completion?
- 5. Were advocacy organisations' views appropriately **reflected** in the PIA Report?

However, it was known that there was a low incidence of published Reports. Hence:

6. Did the PIA **Report come to light** later, e.g. as a result of an FoI request by the media?

## PIAs don't operate as a Control Mechanism over Australian National Security Initiatives

### AGD

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
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- **Passed** the 5-factor test 2/36
- Engagement with advocacy organisations 3/36 (but their views were ignored)
- Secret (hence flawed) PIA processes 10/36

### **Other Agencies**

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- **Passed** the 5-factor test
- Engagement with advocacy organisations 5/36



1/36

## **Case Studies**

- 1. Document Verification System (DVS) 2004-15 Some PIAs, but advocates were excluded, and the 2014-15 expansion was done entirely in secret
- 2. ANPR Mass Surveillance 2007-Reneged on publication of the PIA report Committed to PIA processes, but did no more
- 3. Telecommunications Act s.313 2013-15

Impenetrable text secretly interpreted to mean that a 'request' for assistance from a telco or an ISP imposes a positive obligation – any agency, any purpose, no warrant, no controls. And no PIA or other consultation

4. (Meta-)Data Retention

#### 2003-15

No PIA was ever performed, and submissions by 30 advocacy organisations were ignored

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## **Conclusions about PIAs and NatSec**

- 3 of the 72 projects (4%) passed every test
- 57 of the 72 projects (79%) failed every test
- AGD has continually breached expectations, public policy and arguably the law, but has avoided publicity and suffered no sanctions
- 7 advocacy organisations wrote jointly to the AG in September 2011. No reply was received
- The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) is a puppet
- The Privacy Commissioner is a captive
- PIAs <u>don't</u> operate as a Control Mechanism over Australian National Security Initiatives

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## Why Not? The Reasons for Organisations <u>Not</u> to Do a PIA

- Cost
- Delay
- Information Disclosure about the Organisation's Activities
- Opportunity for Opponents to achieve countervailing power



## **Regulatory Failure is Evident**

- Organisations don't undertake evaluation processes that reflect multiple Stakeholders' interests
- So the requirement has to be imposed from without
- But Executives and Legislatures focus on stimulatory measures, not on ensuring appropriate controls and mitigation measures are in place



## 4. Conclusions

### **Policy Perspective**

• Executives and Legislatures need to be forced to perform their functions, and ensure effective regulation of potentially harmful behaviours

### **Research Perspective**

- More and deeper case studies
- Process studies in insecurity
- Studies of effectiveness of particular safeguards



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